“Tell me how this ends,” asked General David Petraeus in 2003. He was speaking of the war in Iraq, which was born out of faulty intelligence and faultier strategic logic, and spiraled rapidly out of control. Today we know the answer to Petraeus’s question: The war ended with tenuous stability for Iraq — won at the price of some 4,500 dead Americans, an unknown but much higher number of dead Iraqis, roughly a trillion dollars in direct costs, and incalculable damage to the United States’ global reputation. By 2012, two-thirds of Americans were convinced the war in Iraq hadn’t been worth it.
But Petraeus might just as well have asked his famous question of a different war — not the war in Iraq, which he’s often credited with salvaging, or even the war in Afghanistan, which he later struggled to turn around, but the covert drone war over which he presided during his brief tenure as director of the CIA.
The drone war is a shadow war, widely reported in the media but officially unacknowledged by the CIA and the White House. Many details remain obscure, but we know that the United States has engaged in “targeted killings” in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, and possibly in Mali and the Philippines as well. The killings — most reportedly carried out by strikes from unmanned aerial vehicles — have targeted suspected Taliban leaders and terrorists, some identified by name and some targeted as a result of a suspicious pattern of activities. Since the strikes are rarely acknowledged, no one knows precisely how many casualties our shadow war has caused, but media and NGO reports suggest that the number of deaths is somewhere between 3,000 and 5,000.